The distribution of patients is increasingly disordered in China, which leads to the waste of medical resources, increase in inpatients' economic burden, and decrease in benefits from health insurance. Institution level-based quota payment for specific diseases represents a typical payment-system reform mode in rural China that rationalizes the distribution of rural inpatients. The aim of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of this mode by estimating rural inpatients' distribution among hospitals at different levels, per capita cost of hospitalization, and actual compensation ratio and then to provide suggestions to advance this mode. Interrupted time-series analysis was applied to evaluate the effect of the reform mode in the study, and Weiyuan County, Gansu Province, was selected as our sample. Institution level-based quota payment for specific diseases in Weiyuan County has rationalized the distribution of rural inpatients and improved their benefit levels. Further research should be conducted to evaluate the appropriateness of medical services, the health outcomes of rural inpatients, and the sustainability and replicability of the policy.
| INTRODUCTION
The Chinese health care delivery system consists of three levels of medical institutions: primary health care institutions, secondary hospitals, and tertiary hospitals. Health care institutions with different levels offer different medical services: Tertiary hospitals mainly provide diagnosis and treatment to patients with critical and serious diseases; secondary hospitals provide diagnosis and treatment to patients with common and frequent diseases, undertake upward-referral services for severe patients, and receive convalescent patients transferred from tertiary hospitals;
and primary health care institutions have the responsibility of treatment, rehabilitation, and nursing care for clearly diagnosed patients with chronic diseases, convalescent patients, and geriatric patients. 1 The clear definition of health care institutions' functions lays the foundation for the rational allocation of health resources, as well as the preconditions for patients, to obtain suitable medical services from specific hospitals. However, until now, this health care delivery system has not been well prepared for the tremendous and complex needs from the demand side since the system is fragmented for its weak coordination between different faculties. 2 Patients' distribution in hospitals at different levels is disordered, as more and more patients receive medical services from high-level hospitals, regardless of the severity of their diseases. Furthermore, this trend is not only common in urban areas but also increasingly clearer in rural areas. 3 The Fifth National Health Services Survey (2013) of China shows that rural residents hospitalized in primary health care institutions accounted for 29.5% of all rural inpatients, which is lower by 11.5% than the figure revealed in the Fourth National Health Services Survey (2008 8 ; nevertheless, inappropriate needs have also been released. As their actual demand elasticity of medical services increases, they consume much more than before, 9 and one of the most important performances is the increasing preference of getting medical services from high-level hospitals. In addition, the improvement in rural residents' economic status and the weakness of primary health care institutions, such as outdated equipment and unsatisfactory environments, further promote the predilection of hospitals at a higher level. 10 The Essential Drug List (launched in 2009) further leads to a decrease in patients' sense of distrust of primary medical institutions. [11] [12] [13] Thus, the original intention of the NCMS to benefit rural residents has not been fully realized because their overall out-of-pocket (OOP) payments have not been reduced 14 and the effective reimbursement ratio of both outpatient and inpatient services were far lower than the nominal reimbursement ratio originally designed by the NCMS plans. 15 The construction of the ordered health delivery system has been recently valued as a vital part of Chinese health reform. 16 In rural China, because the influence of NCMS on patients' health-seeking behavior is tremendous, many health administrators and specialists have realized the need to improve the rationality of patients' distribution and benefit levels and to optimize the payment system. On the one hand, provider payment, defined as "the methods for transferring money to health care providers" by Roberts et al, 17 can change suppliers' behavior. 18 On the other hand, reimbursement schemes for the demand side can transform their behavior because they can change their sensitivity to financial loss related to medical consumption. 19, 20 Under such guidance, several provinces have started to pilot or even reform the payment system, especially for inpatients. One of the most representative reform modes is the exploration of the Gansu Province.
In 2015, a notice regarding the payment system reform was addressed by the Health Planning Commission of Gansu Province. Based on the "distributary" of hospitalization, disease types, and differentiated payment and compensation policies of NCMS, the policy was summarized as "institution level-based quota payment for specific diseases" (IQPFSD). The main measures are as follows.
1 The setting of disease types: According to the spectrum and distribution of hospitalization diseases in Gansu Province, 100 specific diseases are attributed to the county level, and 50 specific diseases are attributed to the township level. Gansu is the first province to explore IQPFSD. Yao Jinwen et al 21 evaluated this reform mode and focused on the rationality of policies such as whether the disease options are scientific rather than evaluating policy effectiveness. In another study of them, 22 Huining, Gansu, was selected as a sample to evaluate policy effectiveness; however, the policy effect had yet to fully manifest during the study period (from 2014 to 2015), and the attention paid to the change in patients' distribution and actual benefits may be insufficient.
Although numerous researchers have realized the key role of the NCMS payment system in promoting the rationality of rural inpatients' distribution, empirical studies regarding actual effectiveness, especially long-term effects, of the payment system are insufficient. This study proposed estimating the effectiveness of IQPFSD, which is a typical payment-system reform mode of NCMS in China and represents one of the reform directions of China. In the study, we used the large NCMS database, which comprehensively reflects the change in rural inpatients' choices of institutions, medical costs, and compensation levels of NCMS. In addition, we applied the interrupted time series that has been widely used for health policy evaluation abroad but rarely in China to quantify the long-term impact of the reform mode. 23, 24 Thus, we can provide suggestions on the practicability of this mode and ways to ameliorate it.
2 | METHODS
| Data source
Weiyuan County was chosen as our research sample, which is located in the central part of Dingxi City in Gansu Province ( Figure 1 ). Weiyuan County had a total area of 2065 km 2 and a total population of 325 000 at the end of 2016, among which the rural population proportion was more than 93% ( Table 1 ). The annual 2016 net income of rural residents in Weiyuan was less than ¥10 000. In 2015, Weiyuan County adjusted and promulgated the Gansu policy, which regulated 170 disease types in county hospitals, 60 in central township hospitals, and 50 in general township hospitals. If an inpatient's actual total cost did not reach the standard quota, then the institutions should pay the OOP expenses in accordance with a certain proportion of the actual costs, which were 30% (county level) and 20% (township level). In addition, if county and township hospitals irrationally transfer inpatients to higher grade hospitals, they will face a ¥1000 and ¥300 penalty per inpatient, respectively. The rest of the policy on payments to institutions or reimbursements to inpatients was consistent with the provincial policy.
Data for this analysis were extracted from the NCMS hospitalization database for Weiyuan County from July 2012 to May 2017. Information on inpatients' medical certificate number, gender, age, admission and discharge dates, admission and discharge diagnosis, compensation level, total fees and details, OOP, and actual compensation expenses were obtained from the database. A total of 194 775 hospitalization records were included in our analysis.
| Study variables
The key indicators to assess the impact of the payment system reform in this study included (1) distribution of inpatients, including constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county and in township hospitals (divide the number of inpatients outside the county/in township hospitals by total number of inpatients), and (2) benefits of inpatients, 
| Statistical analysis
Because our study did not choose control groups, we used interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) as our main analytical method. This method is the strongest quasi-experimental approach to evaluate the longitudinal effects of interventions, especially when a control group is lacking. Segmented regression analysis is an effective statistical method for estimating intervention effects in interrupted time-series studies. [25] [26] [27] In our study, we constructed the model as follows:
where y is the dependent variable that represents the constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county, the constituent ratio of inpatients in township hospitals, the per capita cost of hospitalization, and the mean value of the actual compensation ratio. Independent variables include time, intervention, and time after intervention. "Time" refers to each month from July 2012 to May 2017. "Intervention" is equal to zero before the policy (July 2012 to November 2014) and equal to 1 after the policy (January 2015 to May 2017). "Time after intervention" is equal to zero before the policy and increases monthly after the policy (because there are 30 months before the policy and 29 after the policy, the value of this variable after the policy is from 31 to 59). β 0 is the level of explained variables in the beginning. β 1 estimates the baseline trend before the policy. β 2 estimates the impact of the policy on the level of the output variables (the change of intercept).
β 3 reflects the change in the trend after the policy implementation (the change in the slope). ε is the error term. Number of hospital beds 1526
Number of hospital beds in county hospitals 1200
Number of hospital beds in township hospitals 326
Number of health workers 759
Number of practitioners/assistant practitioners 300
Number of registered nurses 211 e440 LI ET AL. Table 2 shows that, since the policy was implemented, the constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county under NCMS reduced from 11.67% to 10.96%, the constituent ratio in township hospitals increased from 20.53% to 22.51%, and the difference was statistically significant (χ 2 = 120.06, P < 0.001). The ITSA (Table 3 and Figure 2 ) demonstrated that the constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county increased before the reform with no significant difference, and the constituent ratio of inpatients in township hospitals decreased with no significant difference. As the reform was implemented, the constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county increased by 9.228 (t = 4.674, P < 0.001), whereas the constituent ratio in township hospitals decreased by 6.338% (t = −2.345, P = 0.023). After the reform, the slope of the constituent ratio of inpatients outside the county decreased by 0.238% per month (t = −4.266, P < 0.001), and the constituent ratio of inpatients in township hospitals increased by 0.210% per month (t = 2.629, P = 0.011). Table 2 shows that, after the policy was implemented, the per capita cost of hospitalization increased by ¥111.45
| Benefits of inpatients
(t = −3.358, P = 0.001). The ITSA (Table 3 and Figure 3 ) indicated that the per capita cost of hospitalization increased annually before the policy (t = 2.726, P = 0.009). The per capita cost of hospitalization increased by ¥1348.125
(t = 3.848, P < 0.001) as the policy was implemented. After the reform, the slope of the per capita cost of hospitalization decreased by ¥39.309 per month (t = −3.968, P < 0.001).
The mean value of the actual compensation ratio decreased from 52.10% before the reform to 50.97% after that intervention (equal variances not assumed, t′ = 89.288, P < 0.001). The ITSA (Table 3 and Figure 4) showed that the mean value of the actual compensation ratio decreased yearly by 0.396% per month before the reform (t = −2.556, P = 0.013).
As the reform was implemented, the mean value increased by 0.264% with no significant difference. After the reform, the slope of the mean value of the actual compensation ratio increased by 0.396% per month (t = 3.562, P = 0.001).
| DISCUSSION
This study evaluated the impact of IQPFSD on inpatients' distributions and benefits in a typical reform area in rural China. Our results suggested that the proportion of rural inpatients outside the county decreased, which was consistent with previous findings. 28 In addition, the proportion of rural inpatients in township hospitals increased significantly; the value of the per capita cost of hospitalization increased but showed a gradually decreasing trend after the reform. Although the actual compensation ratio was lower than that before the reform, it showed a rising trend after the policy implementation. These findings were inconsistent with those of previous studies, which showed no significant effectiveness. 22, 28 The reason might be that the analysis period we chose was longer than theirs.
ITAS was applied in this study, which not only estimated the level change when the reform of IQPFSD was introduced but also assessed the change in the trend that reflected the long-term impact of the reform and made the results more reliable. Furthermore, because ITSA is not widely used in the assessment of health policy in China, our study serves as specific evidence for the feasibility of ITSA, as well as an expansion of the existing literature.
The payment system in Weiyuan is effective in controlling the reverse flow of inpatients. From the aspect of inpatients, the health sector of Gansu establishes different compensation ratios between inpatients following and swerving from the principle of institution choices, and for those bypassing inpatients, the reimbursement ratio declined to 20% in 2016 and to 0% in 2017, which is lower than that of most other provinces in China. Similar to the conclusion in the study of Brown and Theoharides, 29 because rural residents may prioritize price over quality when choosing institutions, in the process of making a choice, they consider compensation level more or less. Therefore, after the reform was piloted, rural inpatients, especially those suffering from the specific diseases under quota payments, would choose appropriate institutions to obtain higher compensation. From the aspect of suppliers, county and township hospitals will face financial penalties if they transfer inpatients within their treatment scope to higher level hospitals. This measure can prevent irrational upper referrals to a large extent. Because compensation ratios are higher in hospitals at a lower grade, the benefit level of rural inpatients undoubtedly increases.
The achievement of the payment system reform in Weiyuan is also fruitful in improving the benefit level of NCMS inpatients by constructing an incentive and punishment mechanism for hospitals. First, because the quota surplus belongs to hospitals, they will reduce medical costs as much as possible to obtain the surplus. Second, because hospitals themselves must bear the excess part of the quota, they also should control costs. Doctors must reduce unreasonable or unnecessary physical examination, drugs, length of stay, or other avoidable medical services. Thus, the total costs of rural inpatients decreased, while the benefit levels increased substantially. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the underlying problems that cannot be reflected by the data analysis. First, rural residents' capacity to pay is an important factor that affects their health-seeking behavior. [30] [31] [32] To date, the capacity to pay among rural residents is still greatly differentiated. Rural residents with less capacity to pay are more sensitive to pecuniary losses than those with a stronger capacity. The result may be that the inpatients who flow to institutions with lower levels are those with poor pecuniary conditions, which is a manifestation of social injustice. [33] [34] [35] Second, the scarce capacity of primary health care institutions in China remains serious during the country's health care system reform. 36 This situation may deteriorate rural residents' clinical experiences, 37 further reduce their utilization of primary hospitalization services, and weaken the long-term effect of the policy. Third, quota payment for specific diseases exhibits several drawbacks. For example, it may result in doctors' inappropriate behavior, such as elevating the severity of a diagnosis and hospitalization episode separations, reducing service quality, and shuffling inpatients. [38] [39] [40] [41] Considering the lack of accurate assessment of disease severity, the establishment of quota may not be completely scientific. 16 Finally, the payment system reform of Gansu is not strongly associated with improving inpatients' health outcomes, which should be the origin and core of every policy. 42 
| Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, although our study evaluates the policy effect through the NCMS database, we fail to evaluate residents' and doctors' satisfaction with the policy, which is also important in the health policy evaluation process. Second, we cannot analyze the rationality of services and rural residents' health outcomes through the database, which are also important indicators of the policy effect. Finally, our analysis of Weiyuan County may not entirely reflect the effectiveness, sustainability, and replicability of Gansu policy, as well as the whole payment mode.
| CONCLUSIONS
Institution level-based quota payments for specific diseases have improved the rationality of rural inpatients' distribution among medical institutions at different levels in Weiyuan, Gansu, further improving the benefit level of rural residents. Further research should be conducted to evaluate the appropriateness of medical services, rural residents' health outcomes, and the sustainability and replicability of the policy. Additional efforts should also be exerted to minimize the gaps between rural and urban patients and to further improve the equity of the health care system in China.
